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The Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction
Finding methodological consensus for statutory interpretation cases is all
the rage these days.1 Some in the academy sing the praises of a singular judicial
approach to questions of statutory interpretation and bemoan the frustrations
associated with judges implementing a mélange of interpretive techniques. And
now, thanks to Abbe Gluck’s authoritative article, Laboratories of Statutory
Interpretation, proponents of interpretive uniformity have evidence that some
state courts seem to be applying methodological stare decisis to decide
questions of statutory interpretation. After exhaustive reading and analysis of
state statutory interpretation cases—cases that have received far less attention
than their federal counterparts—Gluck describes several important
developments in state legisprudence that she thinks may have significant
implications for the federal system.
But the normative thrust of her work gives us pause. Although Gluck offers
several caveats that qualify her normative conclusions, she is essentially
committed to two views: that interpretive consensus in statutory interpretation
is an important value2 and that the version of interpretive consensus employed
by the state courts in her case studies, a method she calls “modified

1.

2.

See Abbe R. Gluck, Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus and the
New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750 (2010); see also Sydney Foster, Should Courts
Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863 (2008);
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2085
(2002).
Compare Gluck, supra note 1, at 1848 (“A premise of this Article has been that settling on a
consistent approach is a worthy goal for statutory interpreters.”), with id. at 1849 (“[T]he
benefits of a consistently applied, ex ante-announced interpretive methodology might
outweigh the costs of loss of flexibility in the statutory context . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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textualism,” is a normatively attractive compromise between the main claims of
textualists and purposivists.3 Neither of these contentions, however, is
particularly convincing.
There are significant costs to methodological consensus that are given scant
consideration by Gluck or by many others in the academy who sound the battle
cry of interpretive uniformity. Moreover, even assuming the “modified
textualist” regime she presents can work in a sustainable way (and we will
proffer reasons for skepticism here), it suffers from serious difficulties related
to these costs that ultimately render it an unappealing alternative to the more
discretionary approach that the majority of federal and state courts currently
apply. It is not just that we are getting by with a “consistent enough”
interpretive regime on the federal side.4 Rather, there are distinctive,
underappreciated benefits that result from methodological diversity and make
our current regime of dissensus a more desirable approach.
This Essay proceeds in two Parts. First, we argue that dissensus provides
significant benefits to our judicial system that not only merit our attention but
justify the rejection of any form of methodological stare decisis requiring
judges to follow fixed regimes that categorically ignore a statute’s etiology or
the processes used to enact it. Second, we argue that there are serious costs to
the kind of methodological stare decisis Gluck has explored and that careful
attention to the benefits of dissensus demonstrates that modified textualism is,
in the end, normatively unattractive.
i. the difference dissensus makes
The benefits of uniformity are easy to specify—or at least to speculate
about: parties, citizens, and lawyers might better know what to expect from
their statutes, how to argue their cases, and what sources to mine to convince
courts that their readings are correct. Predictability is easy to sell when it comes
to legal design, and advocates of consensus trade on rule-of-law themes to
make their cases.5 It is also easy to highlight the costs of failing to agree on a
consistent methodology for statutory interpretation: the uncertainty could add

3.

Compare id. at 1829-44 (arguing that modified textualism is an attractive compromise for
textualists and purposivists), and id. at 1856 (“My argument . . . is about identifying a
methodology that is both normatively attractive . . . and also likely to generate consensus.”),
with id. at 1846 (claiming that “modified textualism is [not] the only possible, or ‘best’
answer” to all our methodological problems).

4.

Id. at 1767.
Rule-of-law arguments pervade Gluck’s monograph. See, e.g., id. at 1767-78, 1851-53,
1854-55.

5.
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unnecessary burdens to managing a docket, citizens might lack fair notice
about what the law requires, and parties may not know the most effective
arguments to make before adjudicators. Ultimately, although we think the
costs of dissensus and benefits of uniformity are often overstated, the
independent value of interpretive dissensus is wildly undervalued, if not
overlooked entirely. This Part makes the affirmative case for the core values of
interpretive diversity.
To be fair, even without methodological uniformity, there is already some
consensus about the plausible goals for courts to strive toward and the credible
sources available for them to use in the statutory inquiries. One basically can be
a textualist, an intentionalist, or a purposivist—and use text, structure, textual
and substantive canons, public values, purposes, or legislative history to draw
conclusions about meaning. But this generally agreed upon set of goals and
sources is not the sort of consensus we are assessing here.6 Rather, those who
argue for singular interpretative regimes want consensus about which mix of
these goals and sources is appropriate and how that mix should be utilized for
all judicial decisions involving questions of statutory interpretation. It is the
cost of that kind of consensus that is routinely overlooked and that we try to
illuminate here. We offer two arguments below to support the value of
interpretive dissensus: (A) dissensus induces deliberative and transparent
contestation, redounding to the benefit of deeper rule-of-law values; and
(B) dissensus is conducive to the sheer variety of statutory products that is
subject to judicial interpretation.
A. Inducing Deliberative and Transparent Contestation
Dissensus creates a system of open deliberation that has a significant
impact on our legal system and creates tangible benefits. Interpretive diversity
makes each judge work hard to find compromises, render the strongest
argument utilizing all credible sources available, and take seriously all types of
arguments to achieve the best result within the range of permissible
interpretations. This type of diversity also allows our legal system to absorb a
mix of the values underlying various interpretive approaches that might not
otherwise be produced in a unified interpretive regime.
The world of statutory interpretation benefits from having aggressive
textualists, committed intentionalists, and dynamic purposivists in a single

6.

Even this limited type of consensus regime might be subject to criticism. For a provocative
example thereof, see Todd D. Rakoff, Statutory Interpretation as a Multifarious Enterprise, 104
NW. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2010).
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judicial system because it requires each adherent of an interpretive approach to
engage others to argue for a preferred result. If the whole Court embraced a
strict textualism, we would lose some of Justice Scalia’s most thoughtful
opinions; when he digs through legislative history—even if only to undermine
his opponents—his arguments are stronger and more persuasive, not less so.7
So too when Justice Stevens engages with strong textual arguments against his
more clearly intention- and purpose-driven decisions, he is forced to build a
more complete case that takes the text more seriously.8 Without an openness to
dissensus, we would likely see more doctrinaire and less deliberative judicial
decisionmaking in statutory cases.9
To be sure, interpretive consensus might streamline some of the easy cases,
but it will not necessarily aid in all of them. For example, in some instances, it
might bind judges to a clear but misleading text that sits in obvious tension
with what the legislature wanted. An ambiguity might, after all, be “extrinsic,”
arising only after resorting to extra-textual evidence. Yet that very evidence
could be excluded in a consensus regime that allows consideration of only text
at the first stage.10 And when it comes to the really difficult cases that make it
to a second or third tier of review, the goal is not, we think, to decide cases as
cheaply as possible. Here, quick and easy mechanized decisions exact their own
costs on judicial legitimacy—and society more broadly—because difficult
statutory questions often require the consideration of a variety of circumstances
for which interpretive uniformity cannot account. Accordingly, Gluck’s
footnotes demonstrate that many judges who are forced into a methodological
consensus regime admit that it often produces poor results.11

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.
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Two important Scalia opinions that marshal purposivism and legislative history to powerful
effect include his dissents in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon,
515 U.S. 687, 726-29 (1995); and Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 405, 417 (1991).
Justice Stevens’s opinions in both Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 698-704, and Chisom, 501 U.S. at
396-402, evidence seriousness about text that would seem unnecessary if there had been
methodological consensus around intentionalism or purposivism.
This argument is a cousin to that made by Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Inducing Moral
Deliberation: On the Occasional Virtues of Fog, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1214 (2010) (intervening in
the old rules-versus-standards debate with the observation that standards leave room for
citizen deliberation and moral reflection in a way rules cannot).
Some classic “extrinsic ambiguity” cases in the contracts canon include In re Soper’s Estate,
264 N.W. 427 (Minn. 1935) (finding that although “wife” has only one meaning with a
purely textual inquiry, a resort to extra-textual sources reveals that in the text at issue, the
word “wife” actually had the purpose to designate a second, though illegal and invalid,
“wife”); and Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster, 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971) (finding that
although the face of the contract required a specific quantity as a minimum, extra-textual
sources infuse the minimum quantity clause with a much more flexible meaning).
Gluck, supra note 1, at 1781 n.107.
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Poor results driven by a constructed and stiff consensus regime also
undermine the very rule-of-law values that those favoring methodological stare
decisis routinely invoke to support their methodological preferences. Litigants
want to know that they will get a full and fair hearing and that their claims will
be taken seriously, subject to serious deliberation by adjudicators and
decisionmakers. It is not enough to tell them that judges will be bound by
inflexible rules that control the outcome; judges are more than mere umpires
calling balls and strikes, especially when it comes to deciding difficult cases of
statutory interpretation.12 The “expressive” value of the rule of law requires
that litigants know that the law will actually listen to their claims, rather than
mechanically superimpose itself on them.13
Just as living in an “echo chamber” disables the full development of a
meaningful debate,14 a panel of judges who prioritize different sources and
goals in statutory interpretation is more likely to generate productive, useful,
and important dialogue about the difficult issues before them. While such an
arrangement surely creates some level of uncertainty in the judicial process, we
think this uncertainty is unavoidable even if judges are forced to write opinions
through the framework of methodological stare decisis. We would encourage
courts to work within the permissible range of goals and sources for statutory
interpretation to come up with a thoughtful, respectful, and fair application of
a statute in a given case. Trying to force a complex cognitive process such as
statutory interpretation into a narrow framework will ultimately produce
misguided and potentially misleading decisions on the difficult cases with little
gain for the easy ones. Hard cases require debate, contestation, transparency,
and an airing of all grievances, and we think that is something only dissensus
can provide. Candor—at least on a systemic level—is more likely to result from
giving judges the ability to marshal all credible sources to make the strongest
arguments possible. Like other interpretive pragmatists before us, we think
intellectual honesty is a virtue, one that toleration of dissensus is more likely to
promote.15 But although we would probably be “pragmatists” of a sort if we
were judges ourselves (rejecting each foundationalist theory of statutory
interpretation), our meta-theoretical commitment here is slightly different: we

12.
13.
14.
15.

See Aaron S.J. Zelinsky, The Justice as Commissioner: Benching the Judge-Umpire Analogy, 119
YALE L.J. ONLINE 113, 119-20 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/03/03/zelinsky.html.
But see Gluck, supra note 1, at 1854-55 (explaining her version of “expressive” rule-of-law
benefits).
See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2.0 (2009); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED
DISSENT (2005).
But see Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 117 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Intellectual honesty does not exclude a blinding intellectual bias.”).
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are actually pleased that all judges are not pragmatists. A panel of judges who
were all pragmatists could do worse for the system of statutory interpretation
than a mixed panel that was forced to wrestle with the underlying values that
each foundationalist theory of statutory interpretation promotes.
Indeed, the value of this judicial engagement with the panoply of
acceptable interpretive tools runs deep. Because the conventional schools of
statutory interpretation are all based on legitimate constitutional values and
highlight different normative concerns regarding the relationship between the
judiciary, the legislature, and society, our legal system would suffer from the
elimination of any single methodology or the prioritization of one group over
others for all statutory questions. Consistent and enduring interaction between
these various interpretive approaches results in a legal system that incorporates
a vital mix of the values underlying each school of interpretation.
This mix is not only desirable from an instrumental perspective (to
promote better decisions that might redound to the sociological legitimacy of
the republic), but it also builds moral credibility within a democratic political
morality. Because of the close relationship between electoral politics, judicial
appointments, and interpretive approaches, the judiciary risks hermetic
isolation from political choice under a consensus regime. When a President or
governor is elected, his constituents may very well expect him to appoint
judges that take a particular approach to statutory interpretation; state judicial
elections may well turn on citizen preference for one interpretive approach over
others in a given election cycle.16 Dissensus pays respect to democratic
preferences over time, without restricting newly elected or appointed judges to
methodologies that have not been politically vetted—or, indeed, that have been
politically rejected.
To be sure, Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation and other articles seeking
uniform methodologies are sympathetic to lists and hierarchies because they
look “law-like.” But we should resist rules for the sake of rules: the appearance
of the rule-of-law that papers over foundational disagreements about the
proper role of the judiciary is detrimental to our legal system. Allowing
litigants to make all credible arguments to their adjudicators and letting those
adjudicators say what they really think—that is, what was most persuasive to
them—is more likely to incentivize productive, pragmatic, and democratic

16.
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To wit, it sounds like Michigan’s interpretive consensus is coming apart at the seams
because of judicial elections that reflected the people’s lack of sympathy with the consensus
reached in prior cycles of decisionmaking. See Gluck, supra note 1, at 1808-11. Although
Gluck seems to decry the development of interpretive methodology becoming politicized,
we basically welcome it; if only all judicial elections and appointments turned on something
so substantive and so tied to judicial temperament and philosophy!
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deliberation. We should avoid regimes that encourage falsification and hiding
behind a false consensus.
B. Different Statutes Require Different Interpretive Approaches
Interpretive consensus is reductive not only because it can exclude
consideration of relevant sources of meaning but also because it treats all
statutes the same way. Consensus ignores the reality that different statutory
contexts may warrant different methodological approaches. Legislation cuts
across time, place, and subject matter, and thus rigid methodological regimes
are likely to disable more careful attention to differences between classes of
statutes. The alternative—to tailor interpretive regimes to the variety of
statutes that exist—is a kind of pragmatism, to be sure, but it receives little
attention in Gluck’s article because she remains attracted to the search for a
unified field theory in statutory interpretation.17 But there are different classes
of statutes, not all mutually exclusive: common law statutes, criminal law
statutes, “super statutes,” rent-seeking statutes, and statutes passed through
direct democracy—to name only a few. This diversity of statutory product
would be hard to address with a one-size-fits-all approach to statutory
interpretation. The solution, however, is neither to scrape away a small class of
statutes that merit a specialized regime nor to press for a particular specialized
regime for each class of statutes. Rather, as we explain below, there simply are
too many varieties of statutes to make it seem worthwhile to reduce them all
into one general methodology.
In the world of what are sometimes known as common law statutes, broad
delegation to the judiciary is uncontroversial, and the legislature expects judges
to develop the law over time by utilizing a free-form common law method.
This is what might be called the enactor’s “meta-intent.” The easiest example
of this sort of legislation is the set of statutes passed by state legislatures to
encode features of the common law of torts and contracts with the
understanding that common law will continue to develop, unencumbered by a

17.

In correspondence with Professor Gluck about our Essay, she indicated that she believes her
article did not preclude interpretive diversity to account for different types of statutes.
E-mail from Abbe Gluck to author (June 7, 2010, 13:55 PDT) (on file with author). We leave
to her future work to make clear how she can accommodate such diversity within a
consensus regime of modified textualism. But we think it is instructive that no discussion of
this issue made it into a hundred page article that treated two states—Oregon and Texas—
that would seem to invite it. Oregon is an extremely active direct democracy state, and
Gluck’s article reports that Texas’s criminal and civil courts diverge in methodology.
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frozen meaning or intent at the time of enactment.18 It is routine for courts—
appropriately, we think—to treat common law statutes as a type of
authorization for fine-tuning over time rather than as a directive to follow their
language or specific intent in a cabined manner. Indeed, substantive and
textual canons that encourage courts to render statutes consistent with
common law meanings seem particularly appropriate in this class of statutes, as
do interpretive directions to interpret statutes “liberally.” An example on the
federal side in which Congress seems particularly open to common law
development by courts is antitrust law; textualism is contraindicated here and
purposivism prevails.19 But just because purposivism prevails in this domain
does not mean that it should prevail everywhere.
For example, take criminal law as a whole. Those who argue for singular
regimes would consequently force criminal statutes to be read in the very same
way in which civil rights statutes or public entitlements statutes are read.20
This would be troublesome; indeed, many people who generally consider
themselves sympathetic to purposivism or intentionalism reasonably get
worried when that methodology gets applied in the criminal law and
sentencing contexts. Here, there might be greater attraction in substantive
canons, like the Rule of Lenity, that override the search for implied text or
intent or purpose in criminal cases, forcing legislatures to be absolutely clear
when they want to interfere with a defendant’s life or liberty.21 We think it
would be unfortunate to force our courts to lock themselves into a regime that
forbids judges from resorting to substantive canons that may be appropriately
tailored to a specific class of statutes. It may very well be that we want a
textualism of sorts in criminal law, but one informed by prioritizing a
particular substantive canon over legislative history—and even over some of
the more clever uses of textual canons and thin textual arguments supporting
“plain” meanings.22

18.
19.
20.

21.
22.
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See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226 (Cal. 1975).
See, e.g., Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007).
Gluck’s own evidence from Texas is very suggestive: the highest civil courts and criminal
courts in the state cannot reach methodological consensus. See Gluck, supra note 1, at
1787-91. Might this be because criminal law is different? And what does that tell us about
the quest for unified field theory?
See Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125 (1998).
Of course, Gluck’s modified textualism privileges legislative history over canons, as we
clarify in Part II. As applied to all statutory contexts, modified textualism would necessarily
result in the search for legislative intent over the application of the hoary canon of the Rule
of Lenity. We think that calls, at the least, for some independent defense. Gluck might
resort, as she often does, to the abstract “rule-of-law” value promoted by a methodological
consensus that covers all statutes. But here, as elsewhere, we are underwhelmed by the sure-
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Consider Muscarello v. United States, a case in which defendants found
themselves subject to substantial sentences with mandatory minima.23 The
majority opinion—which was authored by Justice Breyer and joined by Justice
Stevens—resorted to purpose and intent to reinforce its conclusion, relegating
the Rule of Lenity to an afterthought that could only be utilized in a case of
“grievous ambiguity.”24 The textual analysis on display in Muscarello veers
toward the absurd, with members of the Court citing the King James Bible,
Moby Dick, Robinson Crusoe, the New York Times, an ad hoc study conducted on
Lexis/Nexis, and M*A*S*H to divine what the word “carry” means. Surely, it
would be an improvement in the realm of criminal law not to let the fate of a
defendant’s sentence turn on whether we can conjure an unambiguous
meaning out of this patchwork of sources. If a consensus regime subordinates
the Rule of Lenity to the search for congressional intent—as modified
textualism and even Justices Stevens’s and Breyer’s intentionalism—we are left
with a more punitive society. And if that is a choice our society would like to
make, it should be made explicitly, and not as an afterthought or an entailment
of a general theory of statutes.
Furthermore, there are other statutory contexts where public choice
realities might demand focus on the text or the “deal”—or, alternatively, where
they might require reinforcing the representation of those who had little access
to the political process that gave rise to the statute.25 It would be a significant
loss for our legal system if an interpretive regime could not allow debate about
the etiology of a statute. Did an interest group write the statute? Is it shifting
the costs of its gains from the statute onto an unorganized and
underrepresented public? If pharmaceutical companies buy themselves a
statute with lobbying and campaign donations, and that statute threatens
public health, would we not want judges to be sensitive to this process point?26
Singular interpretive philosophies cannot meaningfully consider nuances of
public choice or legislative procedure as meaningfully as our current system of
interpretive diversity can. That loss of sophistication may not be worth
whatever benefits interpretive consensus produces.
Consider also “super-statutes” passed by legislatures, where overarching
policy objectives drive so much of the relevant statutory regimes that judges

footedness of the claim that singular hierarchical interpretive regimes—even when they
seem like a mismatch for a whole class of statutes—contribute to the rule of law.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Muscarello, 524 U.S. at 125.
Id. at 139.
See Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term—Foreword: The Court and the
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1984).
See, e.g., Perez v. Wyeth Labs., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999).
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fail in their roles if they refuse to carry out the underlying purpose of the
statutory scheme.27 It is, of course, often difficult to tell when judges have
super-statutes before them. But there are some easy cases, and singular
interpretive regimes can disable interpreters from having an important
conversation about the type of product they are examining. This is a cost of
consensus that we do not believe is worth paying: judges should not be closing
their eyes to the mobilized deliberation and momentous acts that Congress
passes on behalf of the people. The Civil Rights Act of 1964,28 the Voting
Rights Act of 1965,29 and the Endangered Species Act of 197330 are not run-ofthe-mill statutes that should be subject to the same regime as the most recent
minor amendments to the tax code. Judges should not be indifferent to acts
that are quasi-constitutional and constitute us as a people. Interpretive
diversity has allowed judges to be sensitive to these differences in the past; it
would, accordingly, impose a significant cost on our system to lock judges into
only one regime.31
For another striking example, consider the mechanisms of direct democracy
and statutes produced through initiatives and referendums.32 It is not hard to
see how interpreting these enactments might benefit from a more flexible
approach than a one-size-fits-all interpretive regime can offer. Unlike
legislatures, the people in direct democracy often lack the competence to read
the lengthy statutory product placed before them; statutes can be full of
legalese with little context, forcing citizen to use cues, summaries, and
simplifications furnished by legislative analysts, interest groups, the mass
media, and proponent and opponent campaigns. Thus, when the people enact
a measure through direct democracy, voters’ intent rarely corresponds to the
text of the actual statute. By contrast, legislatures, though they may choose not
to read the statutes they pass, at least plausibly can be imputed to enact the

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

32.
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See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 DUKE L.J. 1215 (2001).
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 28, and 42
U.S.C. (2006)).
Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1
(2006)).
Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.
(2006)).
See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Warp and Woof of Statutory Interpretation:
Comparing Supreme Court Approaches in Tax Law and Workplace Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 1231
(2009) (showing very different uses of legislative history and canons in two very different
statutory contexts).
See Ethan J. Leib, Interpreting Statutes Passed Through Referendums, 7 ELECTION L.J. 49
(2008).
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specific text of a law. Accordingly, a simplistic textualism or intentionalism
would be troubling in the context of direct democracy.33 Or consider the
problem of criminal laws (such as three-strikes laws) passed through direct
democracy, which reveal complex interactions between different statutory
contexts that may call for even more refined and subtle thinking about how to
approach a particular statute. With the proliferation of contexts and
“intersectional” statutes, singular approaches look less and less viable.
Finally, compare the class of new statutes to the class of old statutes. It
seems plausible that we would want courts to feel a little freer to update older
statutes than newer statutes where a contemporaneous majority has just
spoken to a statutory question. Might we not feel that more judicial deference
is warranted to newer statutes than older ones? Doesn’t asking judges to
update obsolete statutes that have not been updated for public choice reasons
seem less offensive than asking judges to rewrite clear policy choices that have
been made explicitly and recently? While there are no easy answers to these
questions, they reveal that real debates and meaningful dimensions of analysis
could be lost if consensus reins.34 Ultimately, we doubt that respecting
interpretive diversity can lead to any generalized form of methodological
consensus.
We think that we have made a strong case for protecting interpretive
dissensus from any generalized, one-size-fits-all approach to methodological
stare decisis. But after analyzing the specifics of the Gluck’s interpretive

33.

34.

We do not think this is the place to resolve exactly how statutes passed through direct
democracy ought to be interpreted. It suffices for our purposes to note the procedural and
substantive differences that arise in this context and suggest that a singular interpretive
regime to control questions in all statutory contexts is unappealing. For the main articles in
the field proposing individualized regimes, specific canons, and particular ways to navigate
the miasma of text, intent, purpose, constitutional norms, and policy in the direct
democracy context, see Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution,
Canons, Direct Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477; Evan C. Johnson, People v. Floyd:
An Argument Against Intentionalist Interpretation of Voter Initiatives, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
981 (2005); Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretative Dilemmas in Direct
Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 110, 114 (1995); Glenn C. Smith, Solving the “Initiatory
Construction” Puzzle (and Improving Direct Democracy) by Appropriate Refocusing on Sponsor
Intent, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 257 (2007); Note, Judicial Approaches to Direct Democracy, 118
HARV. L. REV. 2748 (2005). But see Jack L. Landau, Interpreting Statutes Enacted by Initiative:
An Assessment of Proposals To Apply Specialized Interpretive Rules, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 487
(1998) (arguing that direct democracy does not present the need for a specialized
interpretive regime).
See David S. Law & David Zaring, Law Versus Ideology: The Supreme Court and the Use of
Legislative History, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1653 (2010) (finding empirical evidence that
courts use legislative history differently depending on the age, length, complexity, obscurity,
and number of times a statute has been amended).
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regime, Part II will apply the lessons learned here to show why “modified
textualism” in particular would suffer from many of the deficiencies we have
identified.
ii. “modified textuali sm” and its discontents
In this Part, we briefly summarize “modified textualism” (Section II.A) and
then discuss why we find the regime to be an unpalatable alternative to
dissensus. Either it will fail (Section II.B) and transform the current debates
scholars and jurists have about statutory interpretation into debates about what
is “ambiguous” (which is itself costly and counterproductive); or, it will work
(Section II.C), and then undermine the benefits described above that accrue to
systems that tolerate interpretive diversity and dissensus.
A. Gluck’s Modified Textualism Defined
Gluck presents “modified textualism” as a three-tiered approach to
statutory interpretation. In “step one,” the judge begins the interpretive
process with the text and the text alone. If the judge identifies a textual
ambiguity, he or she may then review the legislative history of the enactment at
the second stage of analysis. Ambiguity serves as a gatekeeper, restricting the
use of legislative materials until the judge has demonstrated that the text is
unclear. If in “step two” the judge is unable to extract a clear interpretation,
finding the legislative history ambiguous, the judge may then employ the use
of substantive canons of construction. Similar to the barrier between text and
legislative history, ambiguity once again serves as the gatekeeper to using
canons in “step three.”
In sum, modified textualism creates a fixed hierarchical system, which
requires judges to justify their movement outside of the text and then
legislative history by establishing indicia of ambiguity. Initially, the framework
appears clean, simple, and straightforward. But appearances can be misleading.
Indeed, the practice of modified textualism—by Gluck’s own account—reveals
that there is much more going on.
B. Shifting the Battleground Is Not Real Progress in the War
While modified textualism’s major selling point is increased predictability
in the judicial process for hard cases, it is unlikely to achieve it. Modified
textualism’s three-step analysis merely replaces the traditional debate over the
most appropriate application of legitimate interpretive techniques with a new
battle over textual ambiguity and over ambiguity in legislative history. And
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without guidance to help judges understand the threshold inquiry into
ambiguity that is supposed to constrain them, the benefits of curbing judicial
discretion vanish. Detached from the help of any extrinsic aids, textual analysis
and debating whether something is ambiguous may promote even more
unbridled judicial decision by intuition.
Under modified textualism, then, it seems possible that considerable
judicial resources will be expended debating gatekeeper findings about
ambiguity rather than debating the best meaning of a statute in its context.
And, as we are learning empirically and in case law, the concept of ambiguity is
itself quite ambiguous—and perceptions of ambiguity are ultimately colored by
matters extrinsic to the underlying source material alone, whether that is
because of cognitive impairments or ideological handiwork.35 Given how ripe
for manipulation findings of ambiguity can be, this resiting of the debate about
statutory interpretation is a loss of energy without the net gain that might be
possible by debating with the full range of goals and methods of statutory
interpretation generally available. Forcing judges into debates about ambiguity
risks trapping them in an unproductive set of disagreements, which we are
learning empirically can be colored by policy preferences.36 Unfortunately for
modified textualism, the evidence seems to bear out that this is a substantial
new battleground for jurisdictions that embrace the unified methodology.37
Putting this much pressure on threshold tests is a practical and substantial cost
of consensus with nary a benefit to counterbalance it.

35.

36.

37.

See Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F. Guzior & Anup Malani, Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An
Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1 (2010); J. Clark Kelso &
Charles D. Kelso, Statutory Interpretation: Four Theories in Disarray, 53 SMU L. REV. 81
(2000).
An illuminating set of comments on Farnsworth et al., supra note 35, by notable scholars and
judges can be found at: Ambiguity in Legal Interpretation: A Debate, U. CHI. L. SCH. FAC.
BLOG (Apr. 23, 2010, 11:45 AM), http://uchicagolaw.typepad.com/faculty/2010/04/
ambiguity-in-legal-interpretation-a-debate.html.
A careful reading of Gluck’s own case studies shows that this dynamic is already in place in
the states that adopt some version of modified textualism. See, e.g., Gluck, supra note 1, at
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game was not worth the candle. See State v. Gaines, 206 P.3d 1042 (Or. 2009).
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As we suggested in Part I, it is also important to highlight that fixed
interpretive regimes may be unnecessary in the bulk of easy cases. Consider the
view of the former Chief Judge of the Second Circuit:
Easy cases are resolved short of litigation or settled early; the costs of
litigation normally filter them out, leaving appellate judges with the
hard decisions. The statutory issues presented in the cases we must
decide . . . include instances where the phrase at issue, while seemingly
of one clear meaning, seems odd or incoherent when applied to the
situation at hand; cases in which a provision admits of multiple
meanings, each leading to different consequences; and those in which a
statute is unclear because its commands are not precise, contains
contradictory provisions, or is in conflict with another statute.38
Thus, modified textualism might provide the most assistance in the easy
cases where the least help is needed. But it might just as well produce incorrect
results in those easy cases because of the blindfold that requires keeping
probative and convincing evidence out of view. The unwillingness of modified
textualism to allow legislative history to be utilized for confirmatory rather than
expansionary uses is a quite substantial cost that may very well impair
decisionmaking in easy cases.39 And analysis is likely to be manipulated in the
hard cases, where there is little evidence that judges implementing modified
textualism are reaching better, sounder, more appropriate, or more thoughtful
opinions.
Indeed, a serious problem with Gluck’s assessment that modified
textualism is normatively attractive is that it is difficult to know which metrics
to use to assess whether the courts that embrace interpretive consensus are
reaching “better” results. She never gives us any sense about how to render
judgment about what counts as “better” decisions. Better for the social and
public good? Better for an efficient legislative process? Better for efficient
judicial docket management? Gluck needs to define “better” so that someone
can test her theory. It strikes us that, because any one metric feels forced and
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incomplete, a multitude of methodologies is most likely to address the variety
of values at stake.
Ultimately, the easy cases hardly require elaborate theorizing, and the hard
cases may be harder to control than by merely providing judges a checklist as a
cover for struggling with ambiguities. In sum, modified textualism’s
gatekeepers between its steps of analysis all but guarantee that it will not be
able to fulfill its promise of certainty, predictability, and “better decisions.”
C. Consensus Pushes the Interpretive Debate Behind Closed Doors
There is an even larger cost, however, that we attribute to a modified
textualist regime if it does work to constrain judges from looking at extratextual sources in hard cases: it is likely to promote a cleavage between actual
judicial thought processes and their outward manifestations in opinionwriting. Because opinion-writing will be constrained by a rhetoric that conceals
the substantive debate at stake in the hard cases, modified textualism will lead
to judges shielding analysis of why cases were really decided. Interpretive
candor is one of the core values of dissensus we identified in Part I—and we
elaborate upon it here, using modified textualism as a case study.
The current interpretive debate taking place in our courts generally centers
on the proper role of the judiciary in our constitutional system and on the
nature of the court’s relationship with Congress. This is a healthy debate for
our courts to have; as Justice Thomas put it recently, it “strengthens and
informs our legal system.”40 Modified textualism, however, effectively ends
this debate and orders those judges who believe legislative history is a useful
and constitutionally permissible interpretive aid to ignore it until they are
satisfied that a requisite level of ambiguity has been met. But we doubt that
judges and law clerks would follow modified textualism’s commands in their
chambers, even if their opinions are written formalistically or hierarchically in
order to adhere to the methodological command. Indeed, it is hard to imagine
judges ignoring legislative history until they are completely convinced of a
text’s ambiguity.
In this light, consider Judge Randolph’s view of the matter, which suggests
that hierarchical methodological consensus is unlikely to impact brief-writing,
might not effect all the cost savings imputed to it, and could lead to a gulf
between legal reasoning and opinion-writing:
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Stephanie Condon, Clarence Thomas: State of the Union Too Partisan for a
Justice, POL. HOTSHEET (Feb. 4, 2010, 4:46 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/
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61

the yale law journal online

120:47

2010

Nearly every brief I see in cases involving issues of statutory
construction contains a discourse on legislative history. . . . Counsel can
never be sure that the court will find the words plain, and stop
there. . . . Judges read those briefs from cover to cover . . . . Somewhere
during the reading, preliminary views begin to form. When the reading
is done and the case has been analyzed and argued, how can it be said
that the judge turned to the legislative history only after finding the
statutory language ambiguous? The judge himself often cannot identify
exactly when his perception of the words actually jelled.41
Thus, the text in the hard cases will still be viewed by many judges through
the lens of legislative history. But under modified textualism, judicial opinions
must hide this fact: judges and clerks who write opinions will feel constrained
to stick to the party line and write using a checklist. Those opinions will
mislead readers about how the court reached its decision, which is not fair
either to the parties or to the legal system. And it provides little guidance for
those seeking to understand how the law will be interpreted in the future. As
has been documented in English courts, prior to Pepper v. Hart’s lifting of the
exclusionary rule that disallowed citation to legislative history, judges admitted
to consulting extra-textual evidence of meaning even while they refused to cite
it so as to abide by the rule.42
In sum, judges’ desire to be fair to the parties before them is likely to have a
greater influence on judicial decisionmaking than any inflexible theory or
method derived from stare decisis. As Judge Walker explains, “Even a judge’s
strongest theoretical inclinations are tempered by the judge’s desire to accord a
fair hearing to the parties’ arguments and to be open to all credible materials
that might enhance the judge’s understanding of the case.”43 So modified
textualism’s advice to the clerks and judges writing opinions may very well be
to dissemble and reshuffle how a result was reached in order to fit a “fair”
decision into the strictures of methodological stare decisis. This kind of rule of
law gives law a bad name.
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conclusion
Abbe Gluck’s thoughtful and well-researched article attempts to settle a
long-standing debate in statutory interpretation by trying to call a truce
somewhere between textualism and purposivism. We think this compromise
fails. By overstating the benefits of consensus and the costs of dissensus, she
has occluded from view the real and substantial costs of consensus and benefits
of dissensus. Inviting a rigid and possibly misleading application of a “rule”
rather than living with vague but somewhat more honest standards is not a
choice that we think the legal system should make. When the fuller costbenefit analysis is added to the mix—as we have attempted to do here—there is
a much stronger case to be made for letting sleeping dogs lie. We have achieved
a modus vivendi in statutory interpretation—whatever vituperative footnotes
appear in the case law from time to time and however many pages are devoted
to the interpretation wars in law reviews—and it is working just fine. In fact, it
is working better than fine; it is keeping the legal system vital.
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